One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model these exclusions in cooperative game theory, the excluded coalitions value (ϕ E value) was introduced. This value is based on the Shapley value and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. In this article, we deduce some properties of this new value. After some general results, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and the glove game that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.
Introduction
One problem in cooperative game theory is to model situations when two players refuse to cooperate (or the problem of quarreling members in coalitions). One example of such exclusions is the coalition statements of parliamentary parties. Other situations in which incompatible players affect the outcome are teams in firms and markets, for example. To model this, the ϕ E value (excluded coalitions value) for cooperative games was introduced and axiomatized [1] . This value is based on the Shapley value [2] and takes into account that players exclude coalitions with other players. The ϕ E value enhances the approaches developed by [3] to model that players prefer some other players for cooperation. 1 Whereas the approach by [3, 5] modifies the coalitional function of the game, the model by restricts the set of admissible permutations of players. For modeling the preferences of players, both models are insufficient. Assume a parliament with three parties. One party is located on the left, one party is on the right and one party is in the middle. The left and the right parties exclude coalitions with each other. The party from the middle admits cooperation with both parties. In the models by [3, 5] the left and the right parties are connected via the middle party. Hence, all parties cooperate. Using the ϕ E value, the excluded coalition between the left and the right players is considered in a way that precludes a coalition of all three players. 1 Another enhancement of the approach by [3] was introduced by [4] . In this model, incompatible players are linked by an arc of the graph. As well as in the models by [3, 5] , every coalition (especially the grand coalition) obtains a worth-the maximum that could achieved by the compatible players of the coalition. In the model by [4] , loops or parallel arcs are not intended. This limitation does not exist when calculating the ϕ E value. In addition, a further analysis of stable coalition structures based on the excluded coalition partners [6, 7] may be complicated if the worth of the grand coalition, for example, is a superadditive hull.
The articles by [8, 9] analyzed situations where each player could decide to exclude coalitions to all other players. Using exclusions of coalitions strategically was analyzed by [10, 11] . In these articles, a non-cooperative game models the strategic decision of players whereas the values of cooperative game theory determine the payoffs at the last stage.
Since the ϕ E value is a new value, there are many fields of research with fruitful questions. One major question is how excluding of coalitions influences the players' payoffs. For weighted majority games, this question was addressed in [1] . In this article, we deduce the influence of excluding coalitions on the players' ϕ E payoffs. We start with some general games (monotone games) and, in the final stage, we analyze the apex game that could be interpreted as a team situation and glove games that models markets where sellers and buyers deal. For team situations, we show that all employees have a common interest for cooperation. On asymmetric markets, excluding coalitions affect the market players of the scarce side to a higher extent.
The remainder of this article is structured as follows. Basic definitions of cooperative game theory are presented in Section 2. In Section 3, we present our results. Section 4 concludes.
Basic Notation
A game is a pair (N, v) and N = {1, 2, ..., n} is the player set. The coalitional function v assigns every subset K of N a certain worth v (K) , reflecting the economic abilities of
for all non-empty sets K ⊆ N. Hence, the number of players determines the worth of a coalition. The cardinality of N is called n or |N| .
One important value for games (N, v) is the Shapley value. To calculate the player's payoffs, rank orders ρ on N are used. They are written as (ρ 1 , . . . , ρ n ) where ρ 1 is the first player in the order, ρ 2 the second player, etc. The player at position t is noted by ρ(t). The set of these orders is denoted by RO (N); n! rank orders exist. The set of players before i in rank order ρ together with player i is called P i (ρ). The Shapley payoff of a player i is the average of the marginal contributions of i taken over all rank orders of the players:
The ϕ E value is based on the Shapley value. For the calculation of the ϕ E value, we take into account the statements of the players on excluded coalitions. The set of i's excluded coalition partners is denoted by E i . A player excludes only coalitions to single players; |K| = 1, K ∈ E i . The set of coalitions that are not allowed based on E i is called X i , X i := { K ⊆ N| K\ {i} ∈ E i } with |K| = 2. If i does not cooperate with j, we have X i ∩ X j = {i, j} , i.e., if a player i does not cooperate with j, also j cannot cooperate with i. All inadmissible coalitions are denoted by Γ := K ⊆ N| ∃ S ∈ X j , j ∈ N, with S ⊆ K . Thus, the admissible coalitions in the game (N, v) are
The set of admissible coalitions containing player i is denoted by Ω (i) . The tuple (N, v, Γ) is a game with excluded cooperation partners. Example 1. Let N = {1, 2, 3}, E 1 = {{2} , {3}}, E 2 = {{1}} and E 3 = {{1}} . From this, we obtain the following sets X i : X 1 = {{1, 2} , {1, 3}} , X 2 = {{1, 2}} , X 3 = {{1, 3}} . From these sets, we deduce the set of inadmissible coalitions Γ = {{1, 2} , {1, 3} , {1, 2, 3}} and the set of admissible coalitions
The ϕ E value is one value for games with excluded cooperation partners. The primary idea of the ϕ E value is that only marginal contributions to admissible coalitions influence the players' payoffs. All supersets of excluded coalitions are inadmissible.
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Hence, the ϕ E payoff for player i in (N, v, Γ) is calculated by [1] :
In the case of Γ = 
Results
In this section, first we present some results on how excluding of coalitions affects the players' payoffs. We start our analysis with general games like monotone games or symmetric games. After this, we analyze apex games and glove games. Results on weighted majority games were drawn in [1] .
For monotone games, we deduce from Equation (2):
be a monotone game with excluded cooperation partners. For i, j ∈ N, i = j such that neither i ∈ E j nor j ∈ E i , {i, j} / ∈ Γ, we have
Hence, excluding coalitions reduces i's ϕ E payoff in monotone games. In addition, we deduce from Equation (2) the next Corollary:
be a convex game with excluded cooperation partners. For i, j, l ∈ N, i = j = l such that neither i ∈ E j nor j ∈ E i , {i, j} / ∈ Γ, and neither i ∈ E l nor l ∈ E i , {i, l} / ∈ Γ, we have
where {i, l} ∈ Γ , {i, l} ∈ Γ and {i, j} ∈ Γ .
Hence, excluding the "first" player affects the ϕ E payoff of player i more than excluding one more player.
With an example we show that superadditivity 2 is not sufficient. Assume a game with excluded cooperation partners with N = {1, 2, 3} ,
The game is superadditive but not convex. Table 1 shows the marginal contributions and the resulting ϕ E payoff for player 1. In a first step, cooperation with player 2 is excluded. In the next step (last column), cooperation with 3 is excluded additionally. (N, v, Γ) be a symmetric game with excluded cooperation partners. For i, j ∈ N, i = j such that neither i ∈ E j nor j ∈ E i , {i, j} / ∈ Γ, we have
where {i, j} ∈ Γ .
Both players' ϕ E payoffs are affected in the same way. Corollary 3 is similar to properties of other values like the balanced contributions axiom of the Shapley value [12] , the property of fair gain from bilateral links [3] or the splitting axiom of the χ value [7] . Corollary 4 is deduced from Theorem 17 in [1] . It presents the impact of the number of excluded coalitions in a symmetric game.
Corollary 4.
Let (N, v, Γ) be a monotone symmetric game with excluded cooperation partners with n > 2.
Hence, players with a higher number of excluded coalitions have lower ϕ E payoffs than do players with less number of excluded coalitions.
The apex game was introduced by [13] . An overview about the existing literature on apex games is provided by [14] . The apex game is defined for n ≥ 2. There is one apex player i o . The other players are minor ones. All coalitions which contain i o and at least one minor player as well the coalition which contains all minor players get the worth of 1 while all other coalitions get zero. This game could be interpreted as a team situation in firms where i o is the manager. He needs at least one team member to create a worth. 
Proof. Without excluded coalitions, the players' ϕ E payoffs are:
with l ∈ N\ {i o } . The player i 0 does not obtain the marginal contribution 1 in the rank orders at positions 1 and n. In n − 2 from n possible positions, he obtains the marginal contribution 1. The remaining marginal contributions 1 − n−2 n are divided equally to the minor players. Excluding a coalition between i, j ∈ N\ {i o } prevents the possibility for all minor players, to obtain the marginal contribution 1 at position n − 1. Since all minor players are symmetric, their ϕ E payoffs are affected to the same extent. The possibility to obtain the marginal contribution 1 at the second position, if player i 0 is at first position, is unchanged for the minor players. Excluding coalitions between j and i affects the ϕ E payoffs of all players l ∈ N\ {i o } in the same way. Hence, all minor players have a common interest that all of them are willing to cooperate. The next Corollary follows directly:
Corollary 5. Let (N, v, Γ) be an apex game with excluded cooperation partners with i, j ∈ N\ {i o } , i = j, such that i ∈ E j (and/or j ∈ E i ). For all l ∈ N\ {i o } we have
where {i, m} ∈ Γ , m ∈ N\ {i o , i, j} and i ∈ N\ {i o }.
After excluding a coalition between i, j ∈ N\ {i o } , the minor players obtain only a marginal contribution 1 at the second position, if player i 0 is at first position. With excluding further coalitions between minor players this possibility is not affected. Hence, if one coalition between minor players is excluded, further exclusions of coalitions between the minor players do not change their ϕ E payoffs.
The last game analyzed is the so-called glove game [15] . In this game, each player owns either one left glove or one right glove. A single glove has no worth; a pair of gloves has a worth of one. Hence, this game models markets where sellers and buyers deal. The coalitional function for this game is given by
where L (R) denotes the set of left (right) glove owners. The worth of a coalition equals the number of matching pairs it contains.
Corollary 6. Let (N, v, Γ) be a glove game with excluded cooperation partners with |R| = |L| and E i = Without excluded coalitions, the players' ϕ E payoffs are:
Both types of players are symmetric. Excluding coalitions between j and i, i ∈ L, j ∈ R, affects both players to the same extent; they stay symmetric. Hence, on symmetric markets with an equal number of players on each market side, excluding a coalition with a player from the opposite side of the market reduces the players' ϕ E payoffs in an equal way. Now, we analyze asymmetric glove games with |R| < |L| : Theorem 2. Let (N, v, Γ) be a glove game with excluded cooperation partners with |R| < |L| and E i = 
